[...] more shocking: Andrew Christie was a member of the [...]

[...] written a lot about Andrew Christie. His main claim to fame is that he changes up the UDRP requirement that a [...]

[...] awarded Christie a “Domain Dunce” award in 2009 for his attempts to change the plain language and [...]

[...] to be registration or use. He has done this with the help of panelist Andrew F Christie. The pair keep referring to each others’ views on the matter which in turn reference their own decision…. It’s really quite [...]

[...] these dates made it impossible for the complainant to win the case unless they got lucky with a rogue panelist. Indeed, the panelist in this case found that the domain wasn’t registered in bad faith and [...]

Of course, Mr. Christie today would probably cite that article as being written by “a cleary misguided author who differs from the distinguished panelist in Parvi.org”.

I am sure you are growing tired of this and my last few posts made from my iphone do not seem to have made the comments listing.

I would like to stress a few points in an attempt to further clarify what Mr. Berryhill and others have been saying.

1. Both the registration and use must be in bad faith. To argue that registration alone is sufficient is simply silly. That argument was raised by a law firm in BSA.com and they received a RDNH finding in response.

2. Policy 4(b) is a listing of what constitutes evidence. It does not say that the following will constitute bad faith registration and bad faith use.

3. It is incorrect to see any of the listed examples as evidence of BOTH bad faith registration and bad faith use. Each example applies to the specific situation described. The language does not, for example, state “any of the following will be evidence of both bad faith registration and bad faith use.”

4. While 3 of the examples apply to registration and only 1 to use, that does not mean that 4(b)(iv) also applies to registration. A review of examples 4(b)(i-iii) clearly indicates they focus on registration. They are not evidence of bad faith use – such evidence must be separately established. For example, the circumstances showing you registered the domain for the primary purpose of selling it to the trademark holder or a competitor thereof is only evidence of registration intent. To find bad faith use in such a situation the panel would be required to find evidence of bad faith use. This may be shown by the fact that the respondent tried to sell the domain for an unreasonable amount or it may be shown by other evidence.

Example: Lets suppose the rule read: “For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but without
limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of cows and horses.

i. a black cow
ii. a brown cow
iii. a black and white cow
iv. a horse

The fact that (iv) described only a horse does not mean that a horse is also a cow. Nor obviously do examples (i-iii) indicate that a cow is a horse.

The analysis by Mr. Christie (and now unfortunately others) shows a fundamental error of both logic and grammar.
If the rule had stated: “For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii), ANY ONE OF the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of BOTH registration and use in bad faith…” then Mr. Christie’s arguments could possibly be credible.

Mr. Christie’s intention is clearly to expand the UDRP beyond its stated purpose. This can be seen in a 2002 article he authored in the Journal of World Intellectual Property, Vol. 5, No. 1, Jan. 2002). I have sent a copy of the article to the editor asking that he post it as a link. UPDATE; HERE’S THE LINK

There is no support for such a process in the contractual nature of the UDRP, particularly given the many historical comments prepared at the time by those involved in its drafting.